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We investigate the impact of labour market policies on labour and multifactor productivity 
with industry-level data. First and foremost, labour market policies can influence average 
measured productivity through their impact on employment. Other things equal, 
employment growth tends to be associated with lower average measured labour productivity 
growth as more low-skilled workers enter the workforce. However, policies can also have 
sizeable direct effects on individual productivity levels and/or growth by creating incentives 
for workers to invest in training, facilitating reallocation of resources to their most 
productive uses and generating or maintaining high-quality job matches. We find that 
employment protection legislation, minimum wages, parental leave and unemployment 
benefits influence productivity through multiple channels, over and above their impact on 
employment levels. 
GROWTH IN GDP PER CAPITA, one of the pri-
mary economic policy objectives of OECD 
countries, can be decomposed into the growth 
of two components: labour utilisation and 
labour productivity.2 During the 1990s, labour 
productivity growth accounted for at least half 
of GDP per capita growth in most OECD 
countries, and a considerably higher proportion 
in many of them (OECD, 2003). Population 
ageing in many OECD countries means that 
continued productivity growth, along with 
increased labour force participation among cur-
rently underrepresented groups, will be crucial 
to improve living standards in the future.
The impact of labour market policies on 
labour utilisation is well-documented (see 
OECD, 2006, for a summary). However, some 
have argued that certain labour market reforms 
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for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs at the OECD. The authors are grateful to Eve Caroli, John Martin, 
Luca Nunziata, Alfonso Rosolia, Anne Saint-Martin, Stefano Scarpetta, Paul Swaim, Raymond Torres, 
Bernhard Weber, the editor and participants to the March 2007 meeting of the OECD Working Party on Employ-
ment and to the July 2007 IZA/FRDB conference on Measuring Labour Market Institutions for comments on an 
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2 Labour utilisation is defined as total hours worked divided by total population. Growth of labour utilisa-
tion can result from an increase in the employment rate, an increase in average hours worked by the 
employed population and/or an increase in the share of the working age population in the total popula-





















































that increase labour utilisation may at the same 
time reduce productivity growth and have a neg-
ative long-run impact on living standards, at 
least as measured by GDP per capita (Heckman, 
Ljunge and Ragan, 2006). We try to shed some 
light on this issue by examining the impact of 
various labour market policies on productivity 
levels and growth rates. Key channels through 
which labour market policies affect productivity 
are identified and assessed empirically. 
At an aggregate level, the growth of labour 
utilisation tends to be associated with lower 
average measured labour productivity growth. 
Chart 1 shows that there is a negative correla-
tion between the growth rates of labour utilisa-
tion and measured average labour productivity 
between 1970 and 2005. This phenomenon, 
referred to herein as a composition effect, has sev-
eral explanations. First, it arises, in part, because 
conventional measures of labour productivity do 
not adequately control for changes in the quality 
of labour. Aggregate employment growth is usu-
ally associated with faster employment growth 
for the poorly-educated than for the highly-edu-
cated, so reduces the average level of skills and 
productivity among the employed (see e.g. 
Nickell and Bell, 1996; Belorgey, Lecat and 
Maury, 2006). Thus, an increase in employment 
with no change in the average productivity per 
unit of skilled labour and/or individual produc-
tivity for those already in employment would 
lead to a reduction in average measured labour 
productivity. Second, if employment increases 
as a result of greater labour supply, labour-
intensive (often low-productivity) activities are 
likely to expand. While the productivity of indi-
vidual firms or industries could remain 
unchanged, an expansion of low-productivity 
production will depress aggregate productivity 
levels (McGuckin and van Ark, 2004; Dew-
Becker and Gordon, 2006). Finally, other things 
being equal, diminishing returns to labour 
inputs imply that the marginal impact of higher 
employment rates (or longer hours of work per 
worker) on output will be smaller (see e.g. Bour-
les and Cette, 2005). 
In other words, if no other link existed between 
labour market reforms and productivity, a reform 
that increased employment would have a less-
than-proportionate impact on GDP per capita 
because of its dampening effect on average mea-
sured labour productivity, even with no reduction 
in the output of workers already in employment 
prior to the reform. But any slowdown in average 
measured productivity resulting directly from a 
change in employment would be, to a large 
extent, a statistical artefact and would not imply a 
fall in individual productivity. An example is a 
reduction in the generosity of unemployment 
benefits, examined later in this article, which 
encourages more low productivity workers into 
work, but does not necessarily alter the produc-
tivity of existing workers. The implications of 
such a reform for policy evaluation, therefore, 
depend on the relative importance placed by soci-
Chart 1 
Labour Utilisation Growth and Labour Productivity Growth 
in OECD Countries, 1970-2005
(average annual growth rates in percentage)
Note: Labour utilisation growth is measured as growth of total hours worked 
divided by total population. Labour productivity growth is measured as 
growth of GDP per hour worked. 
Source: OECD Productivity database. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 5 
ety on employment and productivity. Indeed, if 
society welcomes employment growth as a posi-
tive development as the disadvantaged become 
integrated into society, any accompanying slow-
down in measured productivity growth due only 
to increased employment could be considered a 
sign of progress. In this sense, productivity 
growth may be a misleading indicator of whether 
society is better off.
Pro-employment policy reforms, however, 
can also directly affect productivity through a 
number of channels. First, policies that influ-
ence incentives for workers or firms to invest in 
training or education can affect productivity by 
altering the stock of human capital. Second, pol-
icies that encourage the movement of resources 
between declining and emerging firms, indus-
tries or activities can enhance productivity by 
helping firms respond quickly to changes in 
technology or product demand. Third, policies 
that improve the quality of job matches or main-
tain high-quality job matches for longer can 
increase the effectiveness of labour resource 
allocation, increasing the level of productivity. 
Fourth, policies that make labour more expen-
sive relative to capital can affect the direction 
and pace of technological change. Finally, poli-
cies that reduce social conflict can condition 
workers’ effort and their willingness to align 
their behaviours with their employer’s objec-
tives. Employment-enhancing policies can also 
have an indirect impact on aggregate productiv-
ity by reducing spending on social support and 
making room for more public or private spend-
ing on education, research and development or 
other productivity-enhancing activities.
From a policy perspective, it is important to 
be able to estimate both the independent impact 
of labour market policies on productivity and, 
whenever productivity effects due to changes in 
employment (composition effects) are likely to 
be large, the overall impact on GDP per capita. 
This article examines the productivity effects of 
four specific labour market policies (employ-
ment protection legislation (EPL), minimum 
wages, unemployment benefits, and parental 
leave) using, in most cases, an approach that 
takes advantage of the fact that labour market 
policies are more binding in some industries 
than others and that within-industry composi-
tion effects are likely to be relatively small.
The remainder of the article is structured as 
follows. The next section briefly outlines the 
method used to estimate the impact of labour 
market policies on productivity. The following 
sections examine the existing evidence and 
present new estimates on the impact of the four 
policies on productivity growth and/or levels. A 
brief conclusion follows.
Exploiting Industry-level 
Differences in the Impact of 
Policies on Productivity
As discussed above, labour market policies may 
exert conflicting effects on average measured pro-
ductivity through composition effects due to their 
influence on aggregate employment levels and 
direct effects on productivity or economic effi-
ciency. Composition effects have been shown to be 
substantial at an aggregate level, however OECD 
(2007a) shows that within-industry composition 
effects are likely to be small.3 This implies that 
3 OECD (2007a) estimates that the apparent elasticity of aggregate labour productivity to hours-adjusted 
employment rates (total hours per person of working age) is in the range of -0.4 to -0.9, which is in line with 
estimates found in other studies (Bourles and Cette, 2005, 2007; Dew-Becker and Gordon, 2006; Gust and Mar-
quez, 2004). The magnitude of the estimates implies that if the composition effect was the only channel link-
ing labour market policies to productivity, a policy reform that increases total hours per capita by 1 per cent 
would reduce labour productivity by 0.4 per cent to 0.9 per cent and result in an overall increase in GDP per 
capita of only 0.1 per cent to 0.6 per cent. In industry-level estimates based solely on within-industry varia-
tion, this apparent elasticity slumps to about -0.1 only and even becomes positive when potential endogene-
ity is taken into account. 6 NUMBER 17, FALL 2008 
industry-level analysis can meaningfully shed light 
on the impact of selected polices on productivity, 
over and above any statistical/accounting effect 
brought about by changes in employment. 
Most of the estimates presented in this article 
use a differences-in-differences estimation tech-
nique, which is based on the assumption that the 
policies examined influence worker or firm 
behaviour more in some industries (referred to 
herein as policy-binding industries) than others. 
For example, if stringent EPL reduces produc-
tivity by making it more difficult for resources to 
flow to high productivity activities, reforms to 
EPL are likely to have a greater impact on pro-
ductivity in industries where, in the absence of 
regulations, firms would rely on laying off work-
ers to make changes to staffing levels and organ-
isation, rather than in industries where internal 
labour markets or voluntary turnover are more 
important. Likewise, changes in minimum 
wages or parental leave policies are likely to have 
a greater impact in industries where employ-
ment tends to be dominated by low-wage work-
ers or women, respectively. 
We use aggregate cross-country data on labour 
market policies from a variety of OECD datasets, 
matched with industry-level data on productivity 
and capital stock, drawn from the OECD STAN 
and the GGDC 60-industry databases, for a sam-
ple of 18 countries: Canada, Japan, Norway, the 
United States and pre-enlargement EU countries 
except Luxembourg (the analysis of minimum 
wages uses a subset of 11 countries with a statu-
tory minimum wage). The time period covered by 
the analysis covers the period 1979-2003 (the 
analysis of EPL covers 1982-2003 due to data 
availability). The sample covers the ten manufac-
turing industries (STAN 2-digit breakdown), plus 
utilities, construction, trade, hotels and restau-
rants, transport and communications, and finance 
industries. Data for other industries are excluded 
either because they include sizeable public sector 
employment or because it is difficult to measure 
their productivity accurately. Bassanini and Venn 
(2007) outline the estimation methods and data 




EPL, the set of regulations governing the hir-
ing and firing of workers, could affect produc-
tion efficiency and productivity growth through 
several channels. Strict EPL may increase pro-
ductivity by acting as a signalling device to 
workers about firm commitment, increasing 
worker effort and incentives to invest in firm-
specific human capital and to cooperate with the 
implementation of productivity-enhancing 
work practices or new technologies (Soskice, 
1997; Belot et al., 2002) or spur productiv-
ity-enhancing investments by incumbent firms 
in order to avoid downsizing (Koeniger, 2005). 
Alternatively, by increasing the cost of firing 
workers, strict EPL could make firms reluctant 
to hire new workers, impeding flexibility and 
slowing the flow of labour resources into emerg-
ing high-productivity firms, activities or indus-
tries (Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993; 
Saint-Paul, 1997, 2002). Stringent EPL also dis-
courages firms from experimenting with new 
technologies, characterised by potentially 
higher returns but also greater risk (Bartelsman 
et al., 2004) and potentially reduces effort (thus 
productivity) because there is a lower threat of 
layoff in response to poor work performance or 
absenteeism (Ichino and Riphahn, 2001).
The existing cross-country evidence on the 
relationship between EPL and productivity 
growth is inconclusive. Using aggregate, 
cross-country analysis DeFreitas and Mar-
shall (1998) find that strict EPL has a negative 
impact on labour productivity growth while 
Nickell and Layard (1999) and Koeniger 
(2005) find a weak positive relationship 
between EPL strictness and both MFP and  INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 7 
significant at 5%  level







Labour productivity growth MFP growth
labour productivity growth.4 Autor et al.
(2007) find that restrictions to the employ-
ment-at-will doctrine in US states have a pos-
itive effect on capital deepening, a negative 
effect on MFP and no effect on labour pro-
ductivity. Using an estimation technique sim-
ilar to that used in this article but for a sample 
of only 11 OECD countries and a narrower 
industry coverage, Bassanini, Nunziata and 
Venn (2008) find a negative relationship 
between layoff costs and MFP growth 
adjusted by changes in labour and capital 
composition. There is also some support for 
the argument that EPL slows the speed at 
which job matches are destroyed in declining 
industries and created in expanding industries 
(e.g. Burgess et al., 2000; Boeri and Jimeno, 
2005; Micco and Pages, 2006; Haltiwanger et 
al., 2006; Messina and Vallanti, 2007).
We estimate the impact of EPL for regular 
contracts using a cardinal index of the strin-
gency of EPL which varies from 0 (least strin-
gent) to 6 (most stringent). We assume that the 
effect of EPL on productivity is stronger in 
industries with greater underlying layoff pro-
pensity, identified based on layoff rates by indus-
try in the United States, the least regulated 
country in the sample. Chart 2 shows that EPL 
on regular contracts has a small but statistically 
significant negative effect on aggregate produc-
tivity growth. A one-point increase in the index 
of EPL stringency – roughly corresponding to 
half of the difference between the OECD aver-
age and the country with the lowest value of the 
EPL index (United States) – appears to reduce 
the annual growth rate of labour productivity by 
at least 0.02 percentage points and the annual 
growth rate of MFP by at least 0.04 percentage 
points.5 The fact that EPL appears to have a 
stronger effect on MFP growth than labour pro-
ductivity growth might reflect a positive impact 
on capital deepening. Although the estimated 
effect of EPL on productivity is small, it is not 
negligible from a policy perspective, since it 
cumulates over time. For instance, if in the 
mid-1980s Portugal (the country in the sample 
with the highest value of the EPL index) had lib-
eralised provisions for regular contracts to 
reflect those of the United States, its labour pro-
ductivity would be more than 1.5 percentage 
4 In Nickell and Layard (1999), the relationship between labour productivity and EPL is not statistically signifi-
cant once the productivity gap with the United States is included in regressions, but the relationship between 
MFP growth and EPL continues to hold.
5 The estimated effect on MFP growth is smaller than that measured by Bassanini, Nunziata and Venn 
(2008). Two main reasons are likely to account for this discrepancy. First, they use a more sophisticated 
measure of MFP, which controls for labour composition and capital quality. Second, and perhaps more 
important, they use a semi-structural Schumpeterian growth model estimated in first differences. The lat-
ter is not replicated here insofar as it is more data demanding and would lead to excessively small coun-
try coverage in the case of the analysis of the productivity impact of statutory minimum wages (see next 
section). 
Chart 2 
Impact of Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) on 
Productivity Growth
Percentage-point impact on labour productivity growth and 
MFP growth of a one-point increase in the EPL index for 
regular contracts
Note: Derived from difference-in-differences OLS estimates. The estimates in 
this chart are calculated by multiplying the estimated effect of EPL in EPL-
binding industries by the share of EPL-binding industries in total GDP. This 
assumes that there is zero impact of EPL in other industries (and in all 
industries that are not included in the sample used in the analysis). There-
fore, the estimates represent a lower bound of the aggregate impact of EPL 
on productivity growth. See Bassanini and Venn (2007) for full methodol-
ogy and results. 8 NUMBER 17, FALL 2008 
significant at 5%  level










points higher than is presently the case. The 
effect on MFP would be even greater.
Minimum Wages
High minimum wages can reduce demand for 
unskilled labour, relative to skilled labour, 
thereby leading to substitution of skilled for 
unskilled workers and increasing production 
without any overall change in the employment 
level (Neumark and Wascher, 2006; Aaronson 
and French, 2007). If more skilled labour is 
employed and more unskilled labour is excluded 
from employment, the aggregate skill level of 
the workforce will increase, thereby raising 
average measured productivity. Minimum wages 
also compress the lower tail of the wage distri-
bution without necessarily affecting individual 
productivity, thereby increasing employers’ 
incentive to pay for training as they can reap the 
difference between productivity and wage 
growth after training (see e.g. Acemoglu and 
Pischke, 1999 and 2003). Moreover, low-skilled 
workers could have a greater incentive to invest 
in human capital to avoid unemployment 
(Cahuc and Michel, 1996; Agell and Lommerud, 
1997; Agell, 1999). On the other hand, by com-
pressing wage relatives between skilled and 
unskilled jobs, minimum wages could reduce 
incentives for the low-skilled to invest in train-
ing. More importantly, high minimum wages 
prevent low-wage workers from accepting wage 
cuts to finance training (Rosen, 1972).
The impact of statutory minimum wages on 
measured average productivity was estimated 
based on the assumption that changes in mini-
mum wages have a greater impact on productivity 
in industries that are more heavily reliant on low-
wage labour. In order to reduce bias due to the 
possible relationship between minimum wages 
and the distribution of low-wage employment, 
low-wage industries are identified based on the 
incidence of low-wage workers by industry in the 
United Kingdom prior to the introduction of 
statutory minimum wages in that country in 
1999.6 Minimum wages are measured as the econ-
omy-wide ratio of the gross statutory minimum 
wage to the median wage. Chart 3 shows that an 
increase of ten percentage points in the ratio of 
the statutory minimum wage to the median wage 
(approximately equal to the cross-country stan-
dard deviation in minimum wages) is associated 
with an increase of between 1.7 and 2.0 percent-
age points in the long-run level of both measured 
labour productivity and MFP. 
It is not clear, however, to what extent the pos-
itive impact of minimum wages on productivity 
is simply due to substitution of skilled for 
6 It is possible that the distribution of low-wage workers in the United Kingdom prior to the introduction of the 
minimum wage reflected economic conditions of the time period examined, rather than an underlying propen-
sity for employing low-wage workers. However, the baseline results appear to be relatively robust to the use of 
alternative indicators based on the average distribution of low-wage workers by industry across a number of 
European countries (Bassanini and Venn, 2007).
Chart 3 
Impact of Minimum Wages on Productivity 
Percentage-point impact on labour productivity and MFP 
levels of a ten percentage-point increase in the ratio of the 
minimum wage to the median wage
Note: Derived from difference-in-differences OLS estimates. The estimates in 
this chart are calculated by multiplying the estimated effect of the mini-
mum wage in low-wage industries by the share of low-wage industries in 
total GDP. This assumes that there is zero impact of the minimum wage in 
other industries (and in all industries that are not included in the sample 
used in the analysis). Therefore, the estimates represent a lower bound of 
the aggregate impact of the minimum wage on productivity levels. See Bas-
sanini and Venn (2007) for full methodology and results. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 9 
unskilled workers, increasing the aggregate level 
of skills and productivity, rather than as the 
result of improved incentives to invest in train-
ing. Competing explanations – that is, training 
vs. skilled/unskilled substitution effects – have 
very different policy implications. In fact, while 
the training story would imply a virtuous link, 
the substitution story would suggest that the 
positive productivity effect is purely a statistical 
artefact and point to undesirable distributional 
consequences of excessive minimum wages. 
Although our specification provides no conclu-
sive way of disentangling these effects, further 
analysis with alternative specifications suggests 
that minimum wages have a more significant 
impact on the level of productivity than its 
growth rate. Insofar as the training channel 
would likely affect the growth rate as well as the 
level of productivity, this result provides some, 
albeit weak, evidence that substitution of high- 
for low-skilled workers is effectively part of the 
story. Therefore, the possibility that a large pro-
portion of the productivity effect of minimum 
wages is due to reduced demand for unskilled 
workers should be kept in mind when drawing 
policy implications from these results.
The effect of minimum wages on productivity 
reported in Chart 3 is estimated assuming that 
factors other than minimum wages have the 
same impact on productivity in both low-wage 
and other industries. Previous research (e.g. 
Bassanini and Duval, 2006) shows that minimum 
wages can influence the way in which the tax 
wedge affects unemployment. The explanation 
for this may be that higher minimum wages 
make it more difficult for employers to pass on 
tax increases to workers, reducing demand for 
labour. If minimum wages intensify the negative 
effect of taxes on employment, the lower 
employment rates that result could induce 
higher levels of productivity through a composi-
tion effect. In this way, the estimated positive 
impact of minimum wages on productivity could 
simply be a result of their amplifying the effect 
of taxes on employment. However, further anal-
ysis shows that controlling for an interaction 
between the tax wedge and the minimum wage 
had little impact on the baseline results, indicat-
ing that minimum wages have an effect on pro-
ductivity that is independent of any interaction 
with taxes.
We also find some evidence that generous 
unemployment benefits may reduce the positive 
impact of minimum wages on productivity in 
low-wage industries. The higher the minimum 
wage relative to the unemployment benefit 
replacement rate, the greater the opportunity 
cost of remaining unemployed. If minimum 
wages increase productivity by reducing demand 
for unskilled labour and providing incentives for 
unskilled workers to invest in training to avoid 
unemployment, high replacement rates could 
dull this effect by reducing the opportunity cost 
of remaining unemployed.7
Parental Leave
Family-friendly policies, such as parental 
leave, may help improve parents’ morale and 
work commitment, having a positive impact on 
productivity by making it easier for parents to 
balance paid work with family responsibilities. 
In the absence of family-friendly working 
arrangements, working parents, particularly 
women, might leave the workforce completely 
for extended periods of time, reducing their 
total work experience and accumulated job-spe-
7 Alternatively, this result could indicate that in low-wage industries, higher minimum wages reduce the posi-
tive impact of unemployment benefits on productivity (see the next sections for a full discussion of the possi-
ble effects of unemployment benefits on productivity). In short, if unemployment benefits increase 
productivity by giving the unemployed a buffer of time or resources to find a well-matched job, higher mini-
mum wages will dampen this effect by increasing the opportunity cost for unskilled workers of remaining 
unemployed and creating an incentive for the unemployed to move quickly into any available job vacancy. 10 NUMBER 17, FALL 2008 
significant at 10% level significant at 5% level
















cific human capital. Firms and workers who are 
assured of an ongoing employment relationship 
might also be more likely to invest in training. 
Alternatively, parental leave could impede pro-
ductivity by reducing parents’ access to training 
and leading to human capital depreciation. Poli-
cies that increase the cost to employers of 
employing parents could lead to discriminatory 
and inefficient hiring outcomes, whereby 
highly-skilled women are concentrated in 
low-skilled jobs. In addition, if new workers 
lacking in job-specific skills are hired to replace 
employees taking parental leave, productivity 
could fall, at least temporarily.
There is very little existing empirical evidence 
on the direct productivity impact of parental 
leave. Gray (2002) finds that the provision of paid 
parental leave has no significant impact on man-
ager-reported measures of labour productivity, 
financial performance, turnover or absenteeism. 
To the extent that higher productivity is reflected 
in higher wages, the literature examining the 
impact of parental leave on wages provides more 
evidence on the expected relationship between 
parental leave and productivity. Time spent out of 
the workforce after childbirth can have a negative 
impact on subsequent wages for women due to 
human capital depreciation or loss of opportuni-
ties to accumulate human capital while away from 
work (Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002). However, a 
number of studies have shown that the availability 
and use of parental leave mitigates the negative 
effects of children on women’s wages by increas-
ing the speed at which women return to work fol-
lowing childbirth (Ronsen and Sundstrom, 1996; 
Berger and Waldfogel, 2004; Dex et al., 1998; 
Burgess et al., 2008; Joshi et al., 1999) and 
increasing the likelihood that women return to 
their pre-birth job, allowing them to capitalise on 
the benefits of accumulated tenure with their 
existing employer, such as seniority, training and 
access to internal labour markets (Baker and Mil-
ligan, 2005; Waldfogel 1998; Waldfogel et al., 
1999). However, the positive impact of parental 
leave on productivity may occur only for rela-
tively short periods of leave, whereas long periods 
of leave lead to substantial depreciation of human 
capital, even if women eventually return to their 
pre-birth job (Ruhm, 1998). 
We estimate the impact of parental leave on 
productivity by assuming that the availability of 
parental leave has a greater impact on productiv-
ity in industries where employment is 
female-dominated. Two variables for parental 
leave are used in this analysis: total weeks of leg-
islated unpaid parental leave, including 
child-care leave; and total weeks of legislated 
paid maternity leave, estimated at average man-
ufacturing worker wages. Chart 4 shows that 
longer unpaid parental leave is associated with 
somewhat higher productivity levels. Assuming 
that there is no impact of unpaid parental leave 
Chart 4 
Impact of Parental Leave on Productivity
Percentage-point impact on labour productivity and MFP 
levels of a one-week increase in unpaid parental leave or 
paid maternity leave from the sample meansa
Note: Derived from difference-in-differences OLS estimates. The estimates in 
this chart are calculated by multiplying the estimated effect of parental 
leave in female-dominated industries by the share of female-dominated 
industries in total GDP. This assumes that there is zero impact of parental 
leave in other industries (and in all industries that are not included in the 
sample used in the analysis). Therefore, the estimates represent a lower 
bound of the aggregate impact of parental leave on productivity levels. See 
Bassanini and Venn (2007) for full methodology and results.
a) The sample means are 64 weeks of unpaid parental leave and 15 weeks of 
paid maternity leave. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 11 
on productivity in non-female-dominated 
industries, a one-week increase in the length of 
available leave is associated with an increase in 
the level of aggregate labour productivity and 
MFP of at least 0.005 percentage points. The 
results for paid maternity leave are more ambig-
uous: longer periods of available paid maternity 
leave are associated with higher productivity 
levels, but the effects are only statistically signif-
icant for MFP. Nevertheless, the estimates sug-
gest that the productivity effect of additional 
paid maternity leave is larger than that for 
unpaid parental leave.8 
These results suggest that if countries with no 
paid maternity leave (such as the United States) 
introduced this measure at the average OECD 
level (15 weeks), they could increase their MFP 
by about 1.1% in the long-run. Further analysis 
suggests that the impact of additional weeks of 
leave on productivity is greater in countries with 
relatively short periods of leave than in coun-
tries that already have generous leave entitle-
ments. Increases in the length of unpaid parental 
leave only appear to be associated with higher 
productivity in countries where paid maternity 
leave is short or non-existent. In countries 
where women already have access to ten weeks 
or more of paid maternity leave, changes in 
unpaid parental leave have no significant impact 
on productivity. It is possible that at least part of 
the observed impact of parental leave on pro-
ductivity is due to changes in the level of 
employment rather than changes in individual 
productivity. For example, firms could reduce 
total employment if they think additional paren-
tal leave will impose costs on hiring workers, 
leading to higher productivity through compo-
sition effects. Over the longer term, firms might 
substitute capital for labour in order to reduce 
the potential cost of parental leave, increasing 
the capital-to-labour ratio and raising labour 
productivity. We estimate that employment and 
composition effects could explain up to half of 
the productivity effect of paid maternity leave 
(and a smaller proportion for unpaid parental 
leave), although this result varies substantially 
between countries.
Unemployment Benefits
There are a number of channels through 
which unemployment benefits could affect pro-
ductivity. First, generous unemployment bene-
fits tend to price low-productivity workers out 
of jobs in imperfect labour markets (Lagos, 
2006), increasing the proportion of high-skilled 
workers employed and therefore the average 
productivity level of the workforce. Second, 
generous unemployment benefits (in terms of 
either duration, replacement rate or both) may 
provide a buffer of time and resources to allow 
the unemployed to find a job that suits their 
skills and experience, resulting in higher quality, 
longer-lasting matches between the unemployed 
and available job vacancies (Marimon and Zili-
botti, 1999), increasing productivity by improv-
ing the efficiency of resource allocation and 
increasing incentives for firms and workers to 
invest in training. Furthermore, it is possible 
that the provision of generous unemployment 
benefits encourages the creation of high-risk, 
high-productivity jobs by making the unem-
ployed more inclined to accept job contracts 
with a high risk of being terminated quickly 
(Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999, 2000). Unem-
ployment benefits may also have some adverse 
effects on productivity. It is well established that 
generous unemployment benefits can increase 
the duration of unemployment spells and the 
level of unemployment (see OECD, 2006, for a 
survey of recent literature), resulting in lower 
8 The statistical significance of the results for both unpaid parental leave and paid maternity leave is somewhat 
sensitive to changes in the sample of countries included in the analysis, but the point estimates are always 
positive, indicating that parental leave has either no impact or a positive impact on productivity. There is no 
evidence that parental leave has a negative impact on productivity. 12 NUMBER 17, FALL 2008 
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productivity through human capital deprecia-
tion and inefficient resource use. In addition, by 
reducing the opportunity cost of unemploy-
ment, generous unemployment benefits may 
lead existing employees to reduce their work 
effort, thereby lowering productivity (Shapiro 
and Stiglitz, 1984; Albrecht and Vroman, 1996).
However, it is difficult to pinpoint the indus-
tries where unemployment benefits are more 
binding. Therefore, the difference-in-differ-
ence methodology we used for other policies 
does not have a straightforward application. In 
contrast with EPL, minimum wages and paren-
tal leave, however, there are long and reliable 
time series on unemployment benefit generosity 
so we can estimate the direct impact of unem-
ployment benefits on GDP per capita using a 
structural growth model. Since more generous 
unemployment benefits are associated with 
lower aggregate employment rates, the overall 
effect of higher unemployment benefits on GDP 
per capita will be negative unless a positive pro-
ductivity effect compensates fully for the nega-
tive employment effect. We can therefore obtain 
some evidence on the impact of unemployment 
benefits on productivity from the direct estima-
tion of their overall effect on GDP per capita.
Chart 5 shows that the generosity of unem-
ployment benefits (as measured by an average of 
gross replacement rates across various earnings 
levels, family situations and durations of unem-
ployment) appears to have no statistically signif-
icant impact, in the long-run, on the level of 
GDP per capita.9 These results suggest that any 
negative impact of unemployment benefits on 
employment is offset fully by a net positive 
impact of unemployment benefits on average 
measured productivity. Furthermore, although 
point estimates are negative, the long-run elas-
ticity of GDP per capita to changes in benefit 
generosity appears to be much smaller than the 
corresponding elasticity of the employment 
rate.10 This cautiously suggests that an increase 
in the generosity of unemployment benefits is 
likely to have a positive effect on productivity 
over and above composition effects.
Both of the channels through which unem-
ployment benefits can potentially have a positive 
influence on productivity over and above com-
position effects – by improving job-match qual-
ity and by encouraging the creation of high-
productivity, high-risk jobs – seem to receive 
9 These estimates are obtained by fitting the augmented Solow growth model described in Bassanini and Venn 
(2007), which was made possible by the availability of long time series for average gross replacement rates. 
The sample covers 18 OECD countries over the period 1970-2002. The countries included in the sample are 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, 
New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Canadian data on gross 
replacement rates refer only to the Province of Ontario. Yet, eliminating Canada from the sample yields an 
even less negative point-estimate, thus reinforcing the results. 
10 As shown in Chart 5, at the sample average, a 10 per cent increase in average replacement rates would 
imply a fall in GDP per capita of about 0.15-0.2 per cent, implying an elasticity no greater than -0.02. 
Such a low elasticity cannot be entirely explained through composition effects.
Chart 5 
Impact of Unemployment Benefits on GDP per capita
Percentage-point impact on the steady-state level of GDP 
per capita of a 10 per cent increase in average replacement 
rate, unemployment benefit duration and initial benefit 
replacement rate
Note: Derived from pooled mean group estimates. For each policy, minimum 
and maximum indicate the smallest and greatest estimate obtained in the 
specifications reported in OECD (2007a). INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 13 
some support from the empirical evidence. Gen-
erous unemployment benefits appear to be asso-
ciated with higher quality job matches, although 
the effects are relatively small (e.g. Poll-
mann-Schult and Buchel; 2005; Centeno, 2004; 
Belzil, 2001; Addison and Blackburn, 2000; 
Polachek and Xiang, 2005). Evidence on the 
relationship between unemployment benefits 
and the creation of high-productivity/high-risk 
jobs is less clear, but suggests that more gener-
ous unemployment benefits increase the supply 
of high-wage jobs (Acemoglu, 1997). Further 
evidence presented in Bassanini and Venn (2007) 
shows a positive effect of unemployment bene-
fits on relative levels of MFP and labour produc-
tivity in high-risk industries compared to low-
risk industries.
Overall, the net impact of unemployment 
benefits on average measured productivity 
appears to be positive. How much of this posi-
tive effect is due to changes in the composition 
of the labour force as a result of the impact of 
unemployment benefits on employment 
remains unclear. Unemployment benefits seem 
to have some independent positive impact on 
productivity, by supporting higher quality job 
matches and facilitating the creation of riskier, 
higher productivity jobs by providing insurance 
against future job loss. Yet, the net impact on 
GDP per capita appears to be small. 
Conclusion
The results presented in this article show that 
labour market policies can have a significant 
impact on productivity levels and/or growth 
rates, over and above their impact on employ-
ment. Stringent EPL has a small negative impact 
on long-run productivity growth, most likely by 
restricting the movement of labour into emerg-
ing, high-productivity activities, firms or indus-
tries. Increases in the ratio of the minimum wage 
to the median wage appear to have a positive 
impact on the aggregate level of measured pro-
ductivity. The effect may be due to improved 
incentives for investing in training or come as 
the result of substitution of skilled labour for 
unskilled labour. The relative importance of the 
two interpretations is key for policy purposes, 
but could not be determined empirically. Addi-
tional parental leave appears to increase the level 
of productivity, in part by allowing workers with 
family responsibilities to maintain their links to 
the workforce, although the magnitude of the 
effect is small and not always statistically signif-
icant. Finally, reforms that reduce the generos-
ity of unemployment benefits are likely to 
reduce the aggregate level of measured produc-
tivity by limiting the time and resources avail-
able to the unemployed to find a well-matched 
job vacancy, discouraging workers from taking 
up – and firms from creating – high-risk, high-
productivity jobs and affecting the skill compo-
sition of the workforce. However, the overall 
long-run impact of lowering unemployment 
benefits on the level of GDP per capita appears 
to be negligible.
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